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This study examines the question of whether the type 
of leadership exhibited by Osama bin Laden which led to the 
devastating attacks of September 11 was a singular 
phenomenon or an example of a recurring type in the Islamic 
world. This thesis proposes that a specific, recurring  
type of charismatic religio-political leadership – first 
exhibited by Muhammad, the prophet and founder of Islam – 
has proven to be spectacularly successful throughout 
Islamic history. This leadership type, firmly rooted in the 
history and ecology of the 7th century Arabian peninsula, 
the birthplace of Islam, centers on the successful 
collapsing together of religious and political leadership 
in the person of a single charismatic individual. 
Historical manifestations are examined using the writings 
of Ibn Khaldun and the individual case studies of the Mahdi 
of the Sudan, the Ayatollah Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden. 
The policy implications - for both cooperation and 
confrontation with a leader of this type – that flow from 
the model are also discussed. Demographic and technological 
trends in the Middle East are examined in order to 
determine whether the relative frequency with which this 
type leader will appear in the near future is likely to 
increase or decrease. The leadership model developed in 
this thesis, which I use to explain the popular success of 
Osama bin Laden in the wider Muslim world, provides U.S. 
policy makers with an additional tool with which to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
On September 11, 2001, thousands of American citizens 
were killed in attacks conducted by followers of Osama bin 
Laden. Americans were shocked and stunned by these 
assaults; never before had a foreign enemy killed so many 
U.S. citizens in the continental United States. Most 
Americans were also mystified about why these attacks were 
carried out. Why would nineteen Muslims, followers of Osama 
bin Laden, willingly sacrifice their lives in order to kill 
Americans they did not even know? 
Americans were similarly shocked and puzzled in 1979, 
when the Ayatollah Khomeini successfully led a revolution 
in Iran that toppled the Shah. As one commentator noted, 
“Khomeini was beyond the experience, if not the 
imagination, of anyone in the United States government. We 
made the mistake repeatedly of trying to deal with Khomeini 
as if he were a government… In every day of the early 
crisis, and right through until this day, there’s been this 
American inability to understand Khomeini.”1  
This study will suggest that the key to understanding 
the success of both Osama bin Laden and the Ayatollah 
Khomeini is their leadership style, a type of charismatic 
leadership that successfully combines religious and secular 
power in one person. This leadership model, morever, is 
rooted deeply within Islam as a social construct, with the 
prophet Muhammad standing as both the archetype and the 
ideal. It will be shown that this charismatic Islamic 
                    
1 Theodore H. White, America in Search of Itself: The Making of the 
President 1956-1980 (New York: Harper and Row, 1982) p.16. 
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leadership model has been spectacularly successful in the 
Muslim world since the time of Muhammad.  
Westerners have always been puzzled by Islamic leaders 
such as bin Laden and Khomeini, in large part because this 
folding together of secular and religious power into one 
person is antithetical to the Western tradition, thus 
As modern Westerners we find it hard to judge 
equably the ambitions of Muhammad, because we 
cannot avoid making the assumption that the 
political and religious realms are separate. The 
Western order of things that has come down into 
existence since the eighteenth-century 
Enlightment has made an essential distinction 
between church and state… A polity in which 
religion and politics are irretrievably 
identified together is felt, even if obscurely, 
to threaten the basic principles that govern most 
Western societies.2 
Another element of Islam that is difficult for the 
West to comprehend is that Islam is not just a religion for 
Muslims. Professor Mamoun Fandy, a native Saudi Arabian 
currently teaching at Georgetown, goes so far in his 
writing as to    
Not capitalize the word “islam” because islam as 
a social text is drastically different from Islam 
as religion… Muslims follow certain “islamic” 
ideas that guide their lives and provide them 
with a stable world outlook. Islam as a social 
text is a language which has its own system of 
symbols.3 
As I will demonstrate in this study, one of the key 
symbols within islam as a social text is that of the 
charismatic religio-political leader. Fandy’s definition of 
                    
2 Peter Partner, God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) p.39. 
3 Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001) p.22. 
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islam with a little ‘i,’ that is, as a social text and way 
of ordering one’s world through the use of specific 
language and symbols, will be the islam addressed in this 
thesis.  
Of course, in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, as Salmon Rushdie pointed out, the formal position 
of the Western governments has been that “This isn’t about 
Islam.” Writing in the present tense he adds “The world’s 
leaders have been repeating this mantra for weeks, partly 
in the virtuous hope of deterring reprisal attacks on 
innocent Muslims in the West, partly because if the United 
States is to maintain its coalition against terror it can’t 
afford to suggest that Islam and terrorism are in any way 
related.” Evidence of this linkage was the visit made to a 
Washington mosque by President Bush in the days immediately 
following the attack. Rushdie points out the incongruities 
of this stance when he asks “If this isn’t about Islam, why 
the worldwide demonstrations in support of Osama bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda? Why did those 10,000 men armed with swords 
and axes mass on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, armed 
with swords and axes?” To this, he answers unequivocably 
“Yes, this is about Islam.”4 Or, as Francis Fukuyama points 
out when comparing Islam to other world cultures, “Islam, 
by contrast, is the only cultural system that seems to 
regularly produce people like Osama bin Laden, the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, or the Ayatollah Khomeini.”5 
Not only is there something unique about the 
charismatic Islamic religio-political leadership type, but 
                    
4 Salmon Rushdie, “Yes, This Is About Islam”, New York Times on the 
Web, 2 Nov 2001 <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/02/opinion/02RUSH.html> 
5 Francis Fukuyama, “It’s still the end of History”, The Daily 
Yomiuri (Tokyo), 29 Oct 2001. 
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as this thesis will argue, Osama bin Laden exemplifies a  
recurring type of charismatic religious leader specific to 
the Islamic world, a type which some indicators seem to 
suggest will be seen again and with greater frequency in 
the near future. The primary purpose of this study is to 
provide U.S. policy makers and the general public with a 
working model of this type of leader, so that the U.S. will 
be better prepared to both deal with bin Laden in the 
present and his successors in the future.  
Samuel Huntington captured the essence of the general 
function that theory should play when he wrote that 
Understanding requires theory; theory requires 
abstraction; and abstraction requires the 
simplification and ordering of reality… 
Obviously, the real world is one of blends, 
irrationalities, and incongruities: actual 
personalities, institutions, and beliefs do not 
fit into neat logical categories. Yet neat 
logical categories are necessary if man is to 
think profitably about the real world in which he 
lives and to derive from it lessons for broad 
application and use.6 
The charismatic religious leadership model developed 
for the Islamic world in this study is one such logical 
category; it is my sincere hope that it will aid U.S. 
policy makers to think profitably about the Muslim world, 
and help them to develop lessons for broad application and 
use in the current War on Terror.  
The simplification required in order to develop theory 
presents a particular challenge when dealing with the 
Islamic world given the frequency with which charges of 
Orientalism are made. This term, originally applied to the 
                    
6 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and 
Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press) p.vii. 
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scholarship of individuals in the West who studied the 
Middle East (or Orient) “has become a negative term in many 
circles.”7 Edward Said, the leading critic of Orientalism, 
wrote in his book of the same name that “Western 
understanding of Islam has less to do with the Orient than 
it does with ‘our’ world.”8 “Orientalists, their books, and 
the very way they wrote and spoke about Islam was, in 
Said’s view, a discourse meant to control the subject 
matter, namely, Muslims and Islam.”9 Said further  
Argued that any western representation of the 
Middle East as a culturally specific entity must 
be seen as an expression of hegemonic authority, 
applied to dominate the disenfranchised, 
dehumanized and voiceless “Others” by turning 
them into objects and “types” who can be 
manipulated and exploited.10 
Clearly this study identifies a specific form of 
leadership and specific “type” of leader in the Islamic 
world. It is a work of synthesis in which a theory about 
one form of successful Islamic leadership is constructed by 
a Westerner (myself) from primarily secondary sources.  
According to Said, this study, then, should be dismissed 
out of hand as a simple expression of Western hegemonic 
power. Charles Lindholm, one astute critic of Said, would 
disagree, however. As he puts it  
Realization of the power and cultural hegemony of 
the West does not require as a correlate the 
rejection of the possibility of constructing 
general comparative arguments about the Middle                     
7 Richard C. Martin, Islamic Studies: A History of Religions Approach 
2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996) p.243. 
8 Charles Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East: An Historical 
Anthropology (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) p.6. 
9 Martin, p.245. 
10 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.6. 
  6 
Eastern culture, nor does it require negating the 
real historical and cultural patterns of Middle 
Eastern society simply because that society has 
been viewed through Western eyes.11 
As will be shown in Chapter II, this form of 
leadership is the outgrowth of the confluence of several 
distinct historical and cultural patterns that converged on 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 8th century. The time period 
covered by this study centers on the historical period of 
islam, from the time of Muhammad to the present day. 
Necessary antecedents, along with future trend analysis are 
also briefly discussed, but only to more fully develop the 
model. The target audience for this thesis is non-Middle 
Eastern specialists, policy makers, and the general public, 
with the hope that it will offer a coherent way to think 
about charismatic religious leadership in the Islamic 
social context.  
There is a tremendous gulf of understanding between 
average U.S. citizens and members of the Islamic world.  
There is a similar gap in knowledge flow between academic 
Middle Eastern specialists and American citizens. The best 
evidence for this is the complete shock and horror evoked 
by the attacks of September 11, and the immediate focus by 
the American public on the question why? This study will 
firmly occupy the strategic middle ground in an attempt to 
bridge both the gap in understanding between the West and 
Islam, and the gap in knowledge between the U.S. policy 
maker and academic. By providing a model for one form of 
leadership that has proven to be spectacularly successful 
in the Islamic world, this study will satisfy Samuel 
Huntington’s primary criteria for successful theory: it 
                    
11 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.6. 
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will explain and encompass the relevant facts better than 
any other theory, it will provide a more useful and 
relevant framework than currently exists, and ultimately, 







































                    
12 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p.viii. 
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II. ORIGINS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
A. HUMAN BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS 
Leadership in the Middle East, as in all human 
societies, begins at the biological level. The human 
species is not a species of lone individuals; indeed,“we 
are none of us truly isolated; we are connected to one 
another by a web of regularities and by a host of shared, 
deep-seated certainties.”13 This web of regularities and 
these shared certainties are what define humans as social 
creatures.   
As a social creature, the human organism is 
biologically set up, or “’wired’ in a certain way so that 
it can process and emit information about certain facts of 
social life.”14 This includes things such as language and 
rules about sex as well as leadership. All of these aspects 
of social interaction can be loosely defined as culture. 
Thus, “we behave culturally because it is in our nature to 
behave culturally, because natural selection has produced 
an animal that has to behave culturally, that has to invent 
rules, make myths, and speak languages.”15 
Human brains produced human culture as a direct result 
of humans living in small hunting groups or bands of fifty 
or so individuals for ninety-nine percent of human history. 
This remains our basic makeup, and since then “agricultural 
and industrial civilizations have put nothing into the 
basic wiring of the human animal.”16 As members of the human 
                    
13 Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998) p.1. 
14 Tiger and Fox, p.16. 
15 Tiger and Fox, p.20. 
16 Tiger and Fox, p.22. 
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species, this wiring is also common to members of the 
Islamic world.  
Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox have described humans 
social system as primarily hierachical and competitive. 
Viewing man as a gregarious terrestrial primate, they point 
out that a group as described above “has to be disciplined 
in order to survive, and this discipline is maintained by 
the ranking system.”17 They delineate several underlying 
processes common to all terrestrial primates that move in 
small bands: 
· The system is based on hierarchy and competition 
for status, which determine access to resources 
and the privelege of breeding. 
· The whole structure is held together by the 
attractiveness of the dominants and the attention 
that is paid to them. 
· Because of this, charismatic individuals can 
upset the hierarchical structure, and by the same 
token, retain power.18 
Thus, a model which focuses on charismatic religious 
leadership in the Islamic world is consistent with, and 
ultimately rooted in, the basic biological origins of human 
social interaction. As Tiger and Fox elaborate when they 
describe the charismatic individual: 
What is involved is one of the most basic of all 
biosocial processes, one that is rooted in the 
evolutionary struggle for dominance within a 
population. The paying of attention to a dominant 
animal is both the basis of political society and 
the major mode of its dynamics. Millions of years 
of biopolitical evolution have programmed the 
primate to be ready to pay attention to dominant 
animals, provided the right cues are given; the 
natural variety within their populations has 
                    
17 Tiger and Fox, p.29. 
18 Tiger and Fox, p.32. 
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ensured that individuals with superdominance 
potential will be thrown up in each generation.19 
Thus, a leader who is able to establish himself at the 
top of a political hierarchy and obtain absolute power 
through the mechanism of charisma is not something unique 
to the Middle East or Islam. It is actually a phenomenon 
that is as old as the human species itself, and is 
something we are wired to accept, if not actually seek. The 
prophet Muhammad tapped into this wiring on the the Arabian 
peninsula in the 7th century and founded a religion  for 
which he then became the archetypical charismatic leader. 
It is to the specifics of Middle Eastern geography and 
local ecology to which we must turn to discover why Islam 
and why him. 
B. ECOLOGY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 
A working definition of the Middle East must first be 
established. For the purposes of this study, the Middle 
East will be defined as the area bounded geographically on 
an east-west axis by the modern states of Morocco in the 
west and Pakistan in the east. On the north-south axis, 
Turkey in the north and the Sudan in the south will define 
these boundaries. Within this region, the overwhelming 
ecological determinant in the 7th century was, as it is now 
the lack of water. Thus, “the Middle East is characterized 
by arid near-desert or desert conditions for most of its 
territory… Everywhere the amount of rainfall, even in the 
rainy winter season, is unreliable, and winter crops grown 
without irrigation often fail.”20  
                    
19 Tiger and Fox, p.47. 
20 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.17. 
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Successful cultivation can and does take place in the 
Middle East. It is important to note, however, that if one 
were to generalize about the Middle East of the 7th century 
such cultivation would be the exception rather than the 
rule, for  
Only about 14% of the vast land mass of the 
Middle East is suited for cultivation, almost all 
of it to be found within the oasis, high mountain 
vales, and especially in the plains and deltas of 
the great rivers where water supply is sufficient 
and relatively reliable: the Nile, the Tigris-
Euphrates, the Karun, and the Helmand.21  
Within the remaining austere 86% of this territory, 
where sedentary agriculture was not an option for survival, 
the history of the Middle East was changed forever with the 
introduction of the camel. While the exact date of 
domestication is unknown, camels were plentiful in the 
region by 1000 B.C. The camel, with its ability to travel 
long distances in arid regions due to its high tolerance 
for heat and thirst, allowed humans to populate the deep 
desert regions successfully. This allowed nomadic camel 
herders to “gather at fertile oases deep in the deep desert 
in the dry summer, scatter to search for water in the 
winter, and find enough grazing to raise large herds of 
camels for use as reliable transport in trade.”22 
The invention of the camel saddle between 500 and 100 
B.C. allowed pastoral nomads to ride their camels. This was 
the final material culture element required for the 
creation of the Bedouin, the fabled warriors of the desert.  
While their absolute numbers remained small, Charles 
Lindholm has observed that camel nomadism, and along with 
                    
21 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.18. 
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it, the Bedouin ideal, ultimately became a “remarkable 
adaption to the conditions found in the hinterlands, which 
has been culturally influential far beyond the number of 
its practitioners.”23 
The Bedouin way of life attained a sort of moral 
superiority throughout the Middle East. Evidence of this is 
still with us. For example:  
· unique among world cultures, the tribal periphery 
of the Middle East has maintained a generally 
positive image in literature of the region. 
· the term ‘Arab,’ now a loose linguistic and 
ethnic designation for generally all inhabitants 
of the Middle East, was originally and still is 
the term the Bedouin used to refer to themselves 
only.24 
The significance of the Bedouin ideal for charismatic 
Islamic leadership, however, lies not only in its dominance 
throughout the Middle East, but in its basic 
characteristics. These can best be summed up as an 
egalitarian ethos and strong emphasis on individuality and 
independence which spring directly from the austere 
limitations of the local ecology, and the pastoral nomad 
solution to coping with the Middle East’s environmental 
constraints. In other words, the “conditions of the desert 
correlate with the deep-seated resistance of camel nomads 
to hierarchy and stratification.”25 Simply put, if desert 
pastoral nomads did not like the local power structure, 
they could load their camels and leave, either 
individually, as a family, or as a clan.  
                    
22 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.19. 
23 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.19. 
24 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.22. 
25 Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East, p.20. 
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This resulted in a resistance to all forms of formal 
or ritualized authority, and an emphasis on leadership by 
acclamation rather than proclamation. As Ira Lapidus 
writes: 
The Bedouin clan regarded itself as a complete 
polity and recognized no external authority. The 
clans were led by a shaykh (chief) who was 
usually selected by one of the clan elders from 
one of the prominent families and who always 
acted in accordance with their counsel. He 
settled internal disputes according to the 
group’s traditions, but he could not legislate or 
command.26 
In the absence of a formal power hierarchy giving 
leaders discrete powers to go along with their title, and 
with no ability to legislate and command by decree, 
effective Bedouin headmen of necessity resorted to an 
informal sort of authority, one rooted in personal 
charisma. Thus, the dominant leadership ethos in the Middle 
East at the time of Muhammad’s birth (570 A.D.), can be 
viewed as a reflection of both mankind’s biological 
imperative for a hierachical social structure centered 
around charismatic individuals, as well as that of the 
dominant Bedouin ideal, an ideal that developed as a direct 
outgrowth of camel pastoral nomadism, itself a response to 
the arid ecological conditions in the Middle East. 
C. POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 
The political geography of the Middle East at the time 
of Muhammad’s birth is also critical to understanding 
Muhammad’s success. The area was dominated politically by 
two great empires: the Byzantine, comprising most of the 
eastern Mediterranean and centered on Constantinople and 
                    
26 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) p.14. 
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the Sasanid, comprising most of modern-day Iran and 
Afghanistan, with its capital in Ctesiphon in Mesopatamia. 
Between the two empires lay two buffer states, the 
Ghassanid (affiliated with the Byzantines) and the Lakhmids 
(affiliated with the Sasanids). Under varying degrees of 
control and political organization, these acted as proxy 
powers for each respective empire in the northern reaches 
of the Arabian peninsula, on the ecological boundary where 
settled agriculture gave way to the desert of the pastoral 
nomads. In this region, the Byzantines and Sasanids either 
could not or would not exercise direct rule.  
South of the Ghassanids and Lakhmids the only 
centralized political authorities lay in Abyssinia (modern 
day Ethiopia and Eritrea) and Yemen. At the time of 
Muhammad’s birth, the heartland of Islam (Mecca, Medina, 
and the Hijaz, or western Arabian Peninsula) was not under 
any direct or even indirect influence from a political 
center. Thus, local manifestations of leadership, whatever 
the source and however expressed, were never in danger of 
being challenged from the center since there was no center 
interested in this periphery. The only threat a local 
leader would face while gathering a following would 
likewise be local in origin, and indigenous to the Hijaz. 
It was into this milieu that Muhammad was born, “in 
Mecca, a town in Western Arabia, perhaps in or near the 
year 570 A.D.”27 He received his first vision and began 
preaching his new religion of Islam in Mecca in 610 A.D., 
when he was 40. When he died in 632 A.D., Islam had not 
only been successfully established on the peninsula, but 
was literally exploding beyond it. The Arab expansion 
                    
27 Lapidus, p.15. 
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became “one of the most astonishing and dramatic incidents 
in world history.”28 When the Arab Empire reached its 
greatest territorial extent in 732 A.D., exactly one 
hundred years after Muhammad’s death, Muslim rule ranged 
from modern day Spain in the West to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan in the East. This phenomenal expansion out of 
the desert stands as the definitive proof that Muhammad’s 
leadership genius had created something unique on the 
Arabian peninsula; Muhammad had not only founded and 
created a religion, but a leadership model that would 
resonate in the Muslim world for the next thirteen 
centuries.    
Thus, the biological, ecological, political, and 
geographical conditions of the 7th century Arabian peninsula 
were conducive to the rise of a charismatic leader who 
could successfully combine both secular and spiritual 
leadership in his person. This leader’s message, however, 
would have to be consistent with, and build upon, the 
egalitarian tribal ethos prevalent among the tribes of the 
peninsula. The operative mechanism which allowed Muhammad 
to overcome this egalitarianism and concentrate both 
secular and religious power in his person was personal 
charisma. The following chapter, using charisma as a 
departure point, will fully develop the model of 
charismatic religious leadership in the Islamic world as 




                    
28 Sir John Glubb, The Life and Times of Muhammad (Oxford: Madison 
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III. THE MODEL 
Max Weber, when discussing charisma, emphasizes that 
the litmus test for a charismatic leader is the relative 
success of his followers, for “above all, his divine 
mission must ‘prove’ itself in that those who faithfully 
surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, 
he is obviously not the master sent by the gods.”29 By this 
test, and in view of the success of his followers, Muhammad 
successfully epitomized the Weberian definition of 
charismatic authority.  
Charles Lindholm elaborates on this Weberian 
definition in his book on the subject, Charisma. Lindholm’s 
working definition of charisma provides the departure point 
for this study. His fundamental finding is that “charisma 
is one way to meet a deep human impulse to transcend the 
boundaries of the ego in communion with others.”30 Thus, he 
echoes the biological origins for personal charisma: the 
basic human need for group belonging. And he regards 
charisma as one mechanism that sets individuals apart in 
this competitive, hierarchical setting. 
Charisma is nearly impossible to quantify, however. 
Lindholm’s definition is particularly useful because it 
focuses on charisma as a social interaction or process. He 
describes it as the “compulsive, inexplicable emotional tie 
linking a group of followers together in adulation of their 
leader.”31 As a social process or emotional tie, charisma is 
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not like a physical characteristic (brown hair, long nose) 
that is either present or absent. Charisma can only be 
identified in terms of a social relationship. It exists in 
the ephemeral space of human interaction. Thus, for 
charisma to exist, the leader must have a group that 
responds to him; without a followership there is no 
charismatic leadership.  
Before discussing the life of Muhammad, however, 
it is important to caveat the source material.  
Most of what we know about Muhammad’s life is 
derived from three sources: 
1. The Koran, written down some twenty years 
after Muhammad’s death. 
2. The early histories and biographies, the 
oldest of which were written one hundred and 
twenty years after the death of the Prophet. 
3. The Traditions, the most reliable version of 
which, by Bukhari, was compiled some two 
hundred and twenty years after the death of 
Muhammad.32 
Thus, there exists a significant time and space gap 
between Muhammad the man and Muhammad the ideal, as he is 
described in the written record. This is problematic for 
historians of Muhammad the man. It is not problematic, 
however, when we view Muhammad as an ideal, and when others 
view him thus. Instead, the ideology of the charismatic 
leadership model personified by Muhammad was simply 
reaffirmed by every victory and success of the Islamic 
expansion. The success of the Islamic armies was not only 
proof of the Prophet’s message; it also sanctified and 
idealized the Prophet’s leadership style. 
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The key elements of this leadership model not only 
define Muhammad’s success, they are also characteristics 
shared by the most successful leaders in the Islamic world 
from the Prophet’s day through the present. They can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Personal charisma 
2. The conscious combination of religious and 
secular roles 
3. The ability to successfully change the 
rules/institutions that initially brought the 
individual to power 
4. The system put in place endures beyond the life 
of the individual 
 
Muhammad’s personal charisma is evident in the 
centrality of his spoken word, for 
Whatever a prophet says must be believed, because 
he has said it, since it is an emotional 
compulsion exercised by him as a person that 
defines the religious experience for the 
faithful. This was the case with Muhammad, who 
was loved first, then obeyed; for his early 
followers, the content of his annunciation was 
secondary to the inspiring emotional impact of 
his personal message.33  
Although charismatic individuals have existed in all 
centuries and among all peoples, there were two specific 
causal factors that made Muhammad unique and enabled his 
stunning success. The first was that he had a receptive 
audience. As discussed in Chapter II, a strong egalitarian 
tribal ethic was prevalent on the Arabian Peninsula in the 
7th  century, and 
The pressures of this competitive ethic 
inculcated a wish amongst the anxious public for 
an ordering voice that would harmonize the 
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warring self-interested co-equal rivals into a 
higher unity. For Muslims, the Prophet provided 
that voice, giving shape and moral cohesion to an 
inchoate and threatening environment by drawing 
all his followers into a single moral community, 
united through shared devotion to the beloved 
exemplary figure.34 
Muhammad’s personal charisma was certainly the key in 
this egalitarian environment, for “There can be no doubt 
that Muhammad’s ultimate triumph was not due to his 
military success but due to his personality. Muhammad was 
not naturally a strong man, but he had the rare gift of 
inspiring intense devotion.”35 
The second element crucial to Muhammad’s success was 
the specific nature of his appeal. Muhammad preached a form 
of monotheistic emissary prophecy: Muhammad spoke for God, 
yet claimed no holiness for himself personally. In effect, 
Muhammad was founding a new tribe, a tribe of Islam, with 
God assigned the role of tribal leader, and Muhammad as his 
spokesman. Thus, “it was a basic feature of the Apostle’s 
policy to destroy tribal loyalties, and to replace them 
with devotion to the Muslim community, and many dedicated 
young Muslims had adopted the new outlook with 
enthusiasm.”36 To become a Muslim, one had only to recite 
the shahadah, or Profession of Faith: “There is no God but 
Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet.” Membership in this new 
“tribe” allowed individuals to actually change something 
that had been previously accepted as immutable: the 
significance of lineage. Thus, a key part of the genius of 
Muhammad’s message was his successful switching of people’s 
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allegiances from previously dominant genetic ties to Allah 
and, by inference, to him.  
While prior to Islam it was possible to change tribal 
affiliation on the Peninsula, it was at best a long and 
cumbersome process, often taking years before one was 
accepted as a member of one’s new adopted group; even after 
acceptance, an individual’s biological background was never 
fully cleansed from the collective memory, and the 
individual was always potentially suspect as an outsider. 
Islam actively welcomed new members through recitation of 
the shahadah, and loyalty to the umma was meant to overrule 
traditional lineage allegiances, thus discouraging any 
remnants of old geneological ties.  
Though Islam was much more inclusive than any kin-
based tribe, it was also more difficult to leave. In fact, 
the penalty for renouncing Islam was death. Apostates were 
executed. More than the threat of death, however, it was 
the personal charisma of Muhammad that both initially 
attracted adherents to the faith, and retained them in the 
early Islamic community. 
Muhammad also consciously combined secular and 
religious leadership in his person. He was obviously the 
temporal leader of the early Muslims, and while claiming no 
divinity for himself, he was the mouthpiece for the literal 
words of Allah.  As Sir John Glubb has noted, “A man who 
claimed to receive direct instructions from God on the 
subject of day to day events must inevitably himself become 
the ruler of the state.”37  The controversy that has 
surrounded the so-called Satanic Verses provides a stunning 
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example of just how crucial this element was in defining 
Muhammad’s success. 
The Satanic Verses refer to a compromise made by 
Muhammad when he first began preaching in Mecca. Professing 
a strict monotheism, Muhammad was under almost continuous 
pressure to reconcile his preachings with the polytheism 
and idolatry practiced in Mecca up to that time. The 
Meccans had no difficulty incorporating Allah into the 
pantheon of Meccan deities, or even acknowledging a 
dominance of one particular deity such as Allah. Muhammad 
initially resisted this compromise, allowing for the 
worship of no other deity but Allah. In his biography of 
Muhammad, Sir John Glubb recounts how members of the 
dominant Quraish tribe in Mecca asked Muhammad 
‘Have you then considered Al Lat and Al Uzza and 
Manat, the third, the other?’ At this point, 
Satan put into the Prophet’s mind to insert the 
words, ‘These are exalted females, whose 
intercession is to be hoped for.’ When his 
recitation was completed, Muhammad prostrated 
himself, as did also the Muslims who were 
present. The idolaters, delighted at the mention 
of their three goddesses as intercessors, 
prostrated themselves also, so that everyone in 
the square of the Kaaba, Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike, bowed down in worship together.38 
These words, which acknowledged the divinity of 
something other than Allah, were accepted as the word of 
God as passed through Muhammad to the Islamic community. 
However, “At length Gabriel appeared to him and told him 
that it was not he but Satan who had put the offending 
verse into his mouth, as had indeed been his custom with 
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all former prophets. The Satanic words were expunged from 
the chapter.”39 
The controversy surrounding the Satanic Verses has 
reverbated in Islam ever since. For, if Muhammad’s claim 
for spiritual divinity was not his physical person, but the 
words he spoke as given him by Allah, and if Satan could 
insert words in Allah’s stead, any of Muhammad’s utterances 
could potentially now be suspect as the words not of God, 
but of Satan. This notion has proven so controversial that 
in the early histories “many Muslim writers, including Ibn 
Ishaq, omit this passage altogether. Modern Islamic 
commentators have at times denounced Christian authors for 
referring to it and accuse them of deliberately trying to 
discredit the apostle.”40 Whether historically grounded in 
fact or not, the centuries old debate over the Satanic 
Verses is indicative of the key role of Muhammad’s spoken 
word. It is only his spoken word that represents the divine 
and spiritual dimensions of his prophecy, and any challenge 
to the holiness and infallibility of that spoken word 
challenges the very core of Islam. The fact that there 
continues to be debate about the Satanic Verses is a 
testament to how heavily Muhammad relied on his spoken word 
to consciously combine his roles as secular and religious 
leader.  
The third element that defines the charismatic Islamic 
religo-political leader - the ability to successfully 
change the institutions and rules that brought him to power 
- is also exemplified by Muhammad. As discussed earlier in 
the chapter, on a macro level the root of Muhammad’s 
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success was his ability to replace existing kin-based 
tribal affiliations with his own spirituality-based Islamic 
affiliation. Utilizing the language of, and building on, 
existing tribal structure, Muhammad convinced his followers 
that the precepts of Islam were supreme. Muhammad was also 
initially treated as a tribal leader by leaders from other 
tribes. Once powerful enough, however, he rejected any 
sense of equality with the other leaders, and vehemently 
maintained his uniqueness as well as the uniqueness of his 
God.  
In more mundane terms, the Prophet was also able to 
successfully establish, then change, marriage rules within 
the early Islamic community, at least for himself. This 
became evident when Muhammad wed his fifth wife, Zainab. 
Thus,  
Chapter IV of the Koran had limited the number of 
wives of a believer to four. The Apostle 
(Muhammad), however, had now exceeded this 
number, but Chapter XXXIII of the Koran 
specifically authorized him to do so. Verse 50 
reads as follows: “O Prophet! We have made lawful 
to you your wives to whom you have given their 
dowries and those whom your right hand possesses 
– this is a privilege for you alone, not for the 
other believers.”41  
When the revelation came down, ordering Muhammad 
to marry Zainab, Aisha (the third wife), who 
alone ventured to speak to him in a frivolous 
tone, is alleged to have remarked, “Your Lord 
certainly seems anxious to gratify your 
desires.”42 
These passages from the Koran and from the Traditions 
of Muhammad foreshadow Charles Lindholm’s analysis of 
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Weberian charismatic leadership when he writes of Jesus 
that “Jesus’s words: ‘It is written… but I say unto you’ 
are the core of the charismatic relation for Weber. 
Whatever the leader says, whatever he asks, is right, even 
if it is self-contradictory. It is right because the leader 
has said it.”43 Muhammad ultimately wed thirteen times. All 
other Muslim males are restricted to four wives. 
The final element which defines charismatic Islamic 
religious leadership - the system enduring beyond the life 
of the charismatic leader - is also exemplified by 
Muhammad. The proof lies in simple historical fact: 
Muhammad received his first revelation in 610 A.D. At that 
time, he was the only living Muslim in the world. By 1985, 
there were at least 162 million Muslims in the Middle East 
alone, with more than three times that number spread 
throughout the rest of the world.44 Islam, the system put in 
place by Muhammad, has not only survived but flourished 
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IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MANIFESTATIONS 
Now that we have rooted a charismatic Islamic 
religious leadership model firmly in the ecology and 
history of the Middle East of the 7th century, and 
demonstrated how this model was both developed and 
personified by Muhammad, a connection must be made to the 
present day. This chapter will trace some of the historical 
threads of charismatic religious leadership in the Islamic 
world. Through the use of key examples, it will be evident 
that charismatic individuals in the Islamic world who have 
echoed the Prophet in words and deeds have not only been 
able to concentrate religious and secular power in their 
person, but have been spectacularly successful.  
A. IBN KHALDUN 
All historical accounts of the Islamic world must 
begin with Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). He has been 
characterized as “the subtlest and most significant pre-
modern Islamic social thinker.”45  Ibn Khaldun’s magnum 
opus, The Muqaddimah (The Introduction), “can be regarded 
as the earliest attempt made by any historian to discover a 
pattern in the changes that occur in man’s political and 
social organization.”46 Intended as an introduction to his 
history of the world, he finished writing The Muqaddimah in 
1377. Ibn Khaldun’s goal for the finished work was no less 
than to define the human condition. The Muqaddimah remains 
the benchmark for modern historiography of the Middle East; 
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as Ira Lapidus has written, “for many of us, the nature of 
tribal solidarity, the character of tribal leadership, and 
the ideological basis of tribal unification have been 
defined by Ibn Khaldun.”47 More significant for this work, 
however, is the fact that Khaldun’s organizing principle is 
social relations. As he states in the opening lines of Book 
1, “It should be known that history, in matter of fact, is 
information about human social organization.”48 
While his organizing principle may be social 
relations, Ibn Khaldun roots these relations firmly in 
local ecology, thus “it should be known that differences of 
condition among people are the result of the different ways 
in which they make their living.”49 One of those ways of 
making a living is nomadic pastoralism as practiced by the 
Bedouin. Ibn Khaldun also considers the individual 
charismatic leader and the institution of Islam as key 
elements in Middle Eastern social organization, thus 
Bedouins can acquire royal authority only by 
making use of some religious coloring, such as 
prophethood, or sainthood, or some great 
religious event in general. The reason for this 
is that because of their savagery, the Bedouins 
are the least willing of nations to subordinate 
themselves to each other, as they are rude, 
proud, ambitious, and eager to be the leaders. 
Their individual aspirations rarely coincide. But 
when there is religion (among them) through 
prophethood or sainthood, then they have some 
restraining influence in themselves. The 
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qualities of haughtiness and jealousy leave them. 
It is, then, easy for them to subordinate 
themselves and unite (as a social organization). 
This is achieved by the common religion they now 
have.50 
Thus, Ibn Khaldun, surveying almost seven centuries of 
Islamic history, and writing when the Islamic world was 
still at the apogee of its power, distills the key elements 
required for successful leadership given the Bedouin 
egalitarian ideal: prophethood, or a specifically religious 
experience, overlaid on Islam, the common religion all 
Bedouin now shared.  
Ibn Khaldun defines prophets as “The various types of 
human beings who have supernatural perception either 
through natural disposition or through exercise.”51 Khaldun 
further elaborates that “It should be known that God has 
chosen certain individuals” and that “the information they 
give is intrinsically and necessarily true.”52 When 
describing the concrete signs that indicate someone is a 
prophet, Ibn Khaldun focuses on two defining 
characteristics, a person’s actions: “they seek to 
propagate religion and divine worship,” and their 
charismatic nature: “the prestige they have among their 
people.”53 In other words, leaders who consciously espouse a 
religious message, and have the requisite amount of 
personal charisma, or prestige, in the Muslim world, are 
successfully able to rise to leadership positions. He 
alludes to the basic human biological imperative of 
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hierarchy and competition within a group setting when, as 
he says, “by dint of their nature, human beings need 
someone to act as a restraining influence and mediator in 
every social organization, in order to keep its members 
from fighting with each other. That person must, by 
necessity, have superiority over the others.”54 
This leadership model is a stepping stone to 
routinized, formal authority, which Ibn Khaldun terms royal 
authority. Analyzing the nature of this royal authority, 
and how it related to the ebb and flow of the various early 
Islamic dynasties, is actually his aim; his primary 
explanatory interest lay in the formation, success, and 
downfall of empires. However, for the purposes of this 
study, what is most important is his observation that a 
charismatic Islamic leader was absolutely essential for the 
successful mobilization of any Islamic society that wished 
to obtain temporal power. He recognized that this model was 
firmly rooted in the Bedouin egalitarian ideal, which 
itself was an outgrowth of local ecology. Although his 
insights on effective leadership were drawn from the first 
seven centuries of Islam, a period “characterized by the 
gradual evolution and stabilization of Islamic religious, 
political, and cultural systems,”55 they are equally 
descriptive of these systems in the succeeding seven 
centuries. 
Ibn Khaldun’s analysis, written from within the 
dominant Sunni tradition, treated Islam as a single 
monolithic religion. Islam, however, is not monolithic, and 
except for a brief 29 year period known as the rule of the 
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Rightly Guided Caliphs immediately following Muhammad’s 
death, Islam has become as theologically fractured and 
splintered as any other world religion. The primary schism 
in Islam is between Sunni and Shi’i; it is important to 
note, however, that Shi’i Muslims “differ little from 
Sunnis in belief and practice.”56 It is Islamic mysticism, 
or Sufism, which provides both a significant difference in 
praxis, as well as the third element in what has been 
termed the three “main expressions of Islam.”57 Thus, to 
demonstrate the validity of my model of religio-political 
Islamic leadership in the modern era, I will briefly 
examine leaders drawn from the Sunni, Shi’i, and Sufi 
traditions. 
B. THE MAHDI 
It was from the Sufi tradition that Muhammad Ahmad, 
known as the Mahdi, arose in the 19th century. He led a 
revolt in the Sudan that successfully overthrew a despotic 
and imperial Egyptian administration of the area in the 
1880s. His leadership in this revolt has been characterized 
as the “most striking example of the political power of a 
religious leader”58 in the 19th century. The Islamic state he 
created then ruled the Sudan from 1881 to 1898. The revolt 
itself  
Drew some of its strength from opposition to the 
foreign governors, but had far deeper roots. 
Muhammad Ahmad, who founded it, drew his 
inspiration from his Sufi training, and was 
regarded by his followers as the mahdi, the one 
guided by God to restore the reign of justice in 
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the world. His movement spread quickly… After 
ending Egyptian rule he was able to create a 
state based upon the teachings of Islam, as 
interpreted by him, and consciously modeled upon 
the ideal community of the Prophet and his 
Companions. This state was carried on by his 
khalifa after his death, but was ended by the 
Anglo-Egyptian occupation at the end of the 
century.59 
Many aspects of the Mahdi’s rise to power reflect both 
Ibn Khaldun’s observations and the leadership model 
described in this study. He and his followers have been 
characterized by Ira Lapidus as comprising a “charismatic 
revolutionary movement.”60 His personal charisma was 
apparent even as he made his first claim to the Mahdiship, 
and when “the common people thronged about him, he would 
speak to them with great emotion, urging them to abandon 
this world and turn to the world to come. To them he also 
confided the secret that the Mahdiship had been conferred 
upon him by the Prophet.”61 He also claimed descent from 
Muhammad. Thus, he consciously established a direct 
spiritual and biological link with Muhammad, the 
charismatic Islamic leadership archetype.  
The individuals who responded to the Mahdi’s call to 
arms also provide evidence that he was appealing to Muslims 
as a charismatic leader working within the Bedouin 
egalitarian ideal. In fact, “Baqqara nomads made up the 
bulk of his army.”62 While the majority of the Mahdi’s 
immediate followers were nomads, he also appealed to 
                    
59 Hourani, p.313. 
60 Lapidus, p.854. 
61 P.N. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1958) p.45. 
62 Lapidus, p.854. 
  33 
Muslims elsewhere, for “during the Mahdi’s lifetime, his 
rebellion attracted considerable attention throughout the 
Islamic world. His stunning success in routing the Anglo-
Egyptian army and establishing an indigenous Islamic state 
offered hope to Muslims everywhere.”63 Just as the stunning 
military success of early Islam provided the ultimate proof 
of Muhammad’s message, the Mahdi’s secular and military 
success validated both his personal claim to prophethood 
and the charismatic leadership model he had successfully 
tapped into among Muslims worldwide. 
The Mahdi died in 1885. The success of the state after 
his death - which fell only after the British sent a 
punitive military expedition to the Sudan in 1898 - 
establishes the last element of the leadership model 
described in this study: it survived the leader’s demise.  
C. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI 
If the Sudanese Mahdi represents the most striking 
example of the political power of a religious leader in the 
19th century, the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran must be 
considered the 20th century’s exemplar. The impact on the 
Muslim world of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, a 
revolution that ultimately brought Khomeini to power, 
cannot be overstated. It has been described as “one of the 
greatest populist explosions in human history.”64 Khomeini 
is not only the most successful 20th century example of a 
charismatic Islamic leader, he is arguably the most 
profound Shi’i example in all of Islamic history. 
On a personal level, Khomeini was clearly different 
from other Shi’i religious leaders: “The charismatic 
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dimensions of his leadership rest on the dialectical growth 
of a unique relationship between Khomeini and his 
followers, whose texture and tone go far beyond the 
ordinary authority assumed by a high-ranking Shi’i 
cleric.”65 In addition, Khomeini had the ability to evoke 
followership without directly asking, thus “with unspoken 
words, unwritten declarations, merely by the assumption of 
an authorial voice for ‘what Islam truly is’ Khomeini 
generates in his audience a compelling obedience, a feeling 
ever so tacit that he is in charge, and that he is to be 
listened to.”66 His mere voice was sufficient; Khomeini’s 
personal presence was not required. The Iranian Revolution 
has been termed the “cassette revolution,” for “Khomeini 
was the first charismatic orater who sent his oratory from 
abroad to millions of his compatriots at home on 
cassettes.”67 Khomeini was, simply, “the undisputed 
charismatic leader of the revolution.”68 The Ayatollah 
Khomeini clearly held, then, those “specific gifts of mind 
and body” that are religious or supernatural in origin that 
Max Weber defined as characteristic of charismatic 
leadership, gifts that are “not accessible to everybody.”69 
Not only did Khomeini have charismatic appeal, he 
consciously combined his role as a religious leader with 
that of political leader. In 1970, while in political exile 
from Pahlavi Iran, he gave a series of nineteen lectures in 
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Najaf, Iraq on the topic of velayat-e faqih, or secular  
rule by the Islamic jurist (religious leader). In these 
lectures, published later that year as Islamic Government, 
he stated unequivocally that it was not only the right, but 
the duty of the Shi’i religious leadership, or ulama, to 
exercise political power in the temporal world over the 
Islamic community, or umma. This was an innovative re-
interpretation of the Shi’i concept of velayat-e faqih, 
which traditionally had “meant no more than the legal 
guardianship of the senior clerics over those deemed 
incapable of looking after their own interest – minors, 
widows, and the insane.”70 To enlarge this concept to 
encompass senior clergy having authority over the state, 
with himself appointed the religious “supreme guide” and 
supreme political authority, was a complete Khomeini 
invention. Khomeini was able to enact a “radical 
transformation in Shia political thought and practice”71 
thus meeting the first criterion in our charismatic Islamic 
leadership model 
Khomeini also consciously modeled himself on Muhammad 
to include this folding together of religious and temporal 
power.  As Khomeini wrote, “Were religion and politics 
separate in the time of the prophet?” He answered, “Now the 
Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was also a 
political person.”72 Khomeini’s followers also viewed 
Khomeini as just such an Islamic ideal-type leader: the 
Ayatollah Khamenei, who both personally knew Khomeini and 
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would become his successor as leader of the Islamic 
Republic, evokes this sense about Khomeini when he writes 
that “Like prophets in his being, Khomeini presents to the 
perspicacious observant religion, politics, revolution, 
God, and the people, all at the same time. His revolt 
brings to mind the revolt of the divine Prophets.”73 
The Ayatollah Khomeini clearly epitomized charismatic 
Islamic religious leadership. Not only was his personal 
charisma obvious even to those who only heard him on tape, 
but he, as well as his followers, consciously collapsed 
together the political and secular leadership roles in his 
person. Once in power, he was able to successfully redefine 
a key concept in Shi’i Islam, velayat-e faqih, and have the 
majority of Iranian Muslims accept his redefinition, a 
rendering that invented an Islamic theological basis for 
his one man rule. Finally, the Ayatollah Khomeini meets our 
last criterion, since the Islamic republic, along with the 
velayat-e faqih system, have endured beyond the life of the 
founder: Khomeini died in 1989, while the Islamic Republic 
of Iran was still with us on September 11, 2001. 
D. OSAMA BIN LADEN  
September 11, 2001 was the date that another 
charismatic Islamic leader -  Osama bin Laden – came to the 
forefront of public attention in the West. Bin Laden is not 
only the Sunni example for this study, but also the 21st 
century example. His roots are firmly in the 20th  century, 
however, beginning in the Afghanistan of the 1980’s, for 
Bin Laden’s leadership experience during the 
struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviet 
invasion was assuredly a transformational 
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experience. Ascetic in lifestyle, often living in 
caves, Bin Laden gave generously of his fortune, 
building hospitals and clinics, purchasing 
weapons and ammunition. Inspirational in his 
rhetoric, he won the adulation of his Afghan 
freedom fighters. The defeat of the Soviet Union, 
a superpower, was confirmation that Allah was on 
their side… A series of bin Laden triumphs – the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, Khobar towers in 
1996, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, last year’s attacks on the 
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen and the most spectacular 
terrorist attack in history, the events of Sept. 
11 – further confirmed for bin Laden and his 
followers the righteousness of their holy cause, 
for surely their small group of committed Muslims 
could not possibly have struck these blows 
against the one remaining superpower unless God 
was on their side… Bin Laden has laid claim to 
the title of commander in chief of the Islamic 
world… During this dizzying series of triumphs, 
Bin Laden’s messianic sense of mission has 
expanded, and his charismatic attractiveness has 
increased.74 
Obviously Osama bin Laden epitomizes the first two 
elements of the charismatic Islamic leadership  model: his 
personal charisma and the fact that he has consciously 
attempted to emulate the prophet Muhammad and combine the 
religious and secular leadership roles in his person. 
Indeed, “Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, an Al Qaeda insider who 
defected to the United States, testified this year that Mr. 
Bin Laden began with a loftier goal: the creation of an 
empire of all the world’s one billion Muslims ruled by a 
single leader.”75 Whether or not Bin Laden is ultimately 
successful is in large part dependant on how he can 
complete the last two elements that define charismatic 
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Islamic leaders: change the rules and institutions that 
brought him to power, and have the system thus put in place 
endure beyond his lifetime.  There are hints that  Osama 
bin Laden’s lack of formal religious training has caused 
him some difficulty with the second to last element; some 
of his fatwas, or legal opinions (such as his “Declaration 
of War”) had doubt cast on them by some Muslims. Indeed, 
some Islamic scholars have issued fatwas of their own 
condemning the attacks of September 11.  Thus, Osama bin 
Laden’s ultimate success is not yet fully determined. His 
success, and success of charismatic Islamic leaders of his 
ilk that follow, will largely be determined by how the 
world community, led by the U.S., responds consequently. It 
is implications for policy that I will discuss in the 
following chapter.    
  
 
  39 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the model of charismatic religio-political 
leadership that has been so historically effective in the 
Middle East, the concomitant policy implications for the 
United States vis a vis the Islamic world are profound. 
When discussing foreign policy implications, however, the 
distinction must be made between strategies of cooperation 
vs. confrontation; while the basic model remains the same 
in both cases, different aspects become more compelling 
depending on whether the charismatic Islamic leader is 
regarded as a friend or foe of the U.S. government.  
A. CONFRONTATION 
The departure point of this study was the attacks on 
the United States on September 11, 2001, and more 
specifically the question of whether or not Osama bin 
Laden’s leadership  could be considered a recurring type or 
a unique event. Having established in this study that there 
exists a distinct model for this form of leadership, it can 
also be stated that Osama bin Laden, as a charismatic 
Islamic leader, can be considered to be in a 
confrontational state with the U.S. government. Indeed, 
Osama bin Laden is personally on the F.B.I.’s infamous Ten 
Most Wanted List, he has issued a fatwa, or legal ruling, 
declaring war on the United States, and the United States 
government has termed the conflict with Osama bin Laden’s 
followers since September 11 specifically as a war, a “War 
on Terror.” With Osama bin Laden and the United States 
government confronting one another, we can now examine the 
policy implications that flow directly from the challenges 
posed by someone who fits our charismatic leadership model. 
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B. SOURCE OF POWER 
The initial source of power for a charismatic leader 
is basic personal charisma, as discussed earlier. Hard to 
define, but recognizable when seen, it can be considered a 
necessary but not sufficient element in the consolidation 
of the charismatic leader’s power. The real key lies in the 
combination of religious and secular leadership which 
occurs in a two step process: first, the charismatic leader 
taps into the Islamic historical memory, utilizing 
religious imagery, words, and actions, and consciously 
emulates the prophet Muhammad. And second, Muslims, ‘soft-
wired’ through the very basic tenets of the religion to be 
receptive to this type of leadership, accept him and his 
message. We have to remember secular and religious 
leadership are successfully folded together in the person 
of the charismatic leader. This melding of roles stands as 
both the leader’s primary source of power and a key element 
whenever there is active confrontation. It is important to 
note that by manipulating the proper cultural symbols and 
using the right language the leader can maintain a strong 
sense of empathy and passive followership from all Muslims 
beyond the circle of his immediate followers. In Osama bin 
Laden’s case, commentator Mamoun Fandy has termed this the 
“bin Lakin group.” He writes that  
As someone who has lived and traveled widely 
throughout Arab countries, I see public opinion 
in the region divided roughly into three 
categories. About 40 percent are with the United 
States and against the terrorists. Another 10 
percent support bin Laden. The remaining 50 
percent are what I call the “bin Lakin group”. 
Lakin means “but” in Arabic. The bin Lakin group 
condemns terrorism, yet sees lots of “buts” and 
“ifs” about the U.S. approach to Arab issues. Its 
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members are never unequivocal in their 
condemnation of terrorism.76 
While they may abhor violence and terror on a personal 
level, this 50 percent of Arabs still find Osama bin 
Laden’s Islamic message and leadership style more 
compelling than the western message, which is largely 
distilled from U.S. policies in the region. Therein lies 
the power of successfully folding together secular and 
religious power in the Islamic world; Osama bin Laden, 
rather than being limited to the active support of only 10 
percent of Muslims, has, through dint of his dual role as 
an Islamic religo-political leader, at least the passive 
support of another 50 percent. 
It follows, then, that any U.S. confrontational policy 
that treats Osama bin Laden as both a political and 
religious leader, or encourages this melding of roles, and 
that focuses on him as a pivotal individual, actually 
reinforces the very source of his power. This would include 
policy actions such as putting Osama bin Laden on the FBI 
Top Ten Most Wanted list, having the President of the 
United States specifically name him as the person 
responsible for the attacks, and focusing the 
military/legal hunt on Osama bin Laden’s person in the 
ongoing war on terror so prominently.  Actions like these 
which put a face on the enemy, or personalize an individual 
as public enemy number one, while inherent to the American 
way of war and an essential element of the standard U.S. 
policy response to crisis, have the effect of increasing 
indigenous Islamic support for the very leader we are 
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trying to oppose. By focusing on, and discussing Osama bin 
Laden as if he is Al Qaeda’s  charismatic Islamic leader, 
we are reinforcing and solidifying the very key to his 
power, which is the successful collapsing of all societal 
leadership roles into his singular person. By demonizing 
him we inadvertently reaffirm and reify him. This is the 
opposite of what we should be doing. 
In fact, if the source of the charismatic Islamic 
leader’s power lies in the successful combination of 
leadership roles, this suggests that a U.S. policy that 
splits the roles would be more successful. 
One policy action suggested by the model presented in 
this thesis is the creation of dissent, or the appearance 
of dissent, within the leader’s inner circle. This could be 
done overtly, by, for instance, emphasizing the key role of 
one aide over another in the American media. Or it could be 
accomplished through covert means. Islamic organizations 
such as Al Qaeda are notoriously faction and fissure-
ridden. This is largely an outgrowth of the same 
egalitarian Bedouin Arab ideal discussed earlier in this 
thesis, reinforced by the proven efficacy of 
organizationally being split into cells for conducting 
terrorism, or asymmetric warfare. This egalitarian ideal is 
captured in contemporary terms by a joke circulated in the 
Arab media following the attacks of September 11; the punch 
line stated that Arabs could not have been responsible for 
flying airplanes into the Twin Towers because they would 
never agree on who would get to be the pilot. Given that 
popular acclamation of the people, or umma, for the just 
ruler’s authority is a key element in the mythology of the 
charismatic Islamic leader, anything that suggests the 
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leader has less than this complete support and authority 
among his immediate followers weakens his claims to 
authority in the Islamic world as a whole. 
In addition, anything that challenges the combined 
secular and religious authority of the charismatic 
individual dilutes not only his power, but the relative 
power of the group as a whole. A specific action that falls 
into this category regarding Osama bin Laden could include 
emphasizing the “mastermind” role of his top aides. After 
all, “American officials continue to believe that the 
September 11 attacks were ultimately coordinated by Mr. Bin 
Laden’s three top lieutenants, Dr. Zawahiri, Muhammad Atef, 
and Abu Zubaydah.”77 By emphasizing the key roles of these 
top aides, and consciously omitting mention of the 
charismatic religo-political leader himself, U.S. policy 
makers would avoid strengthening Osama bin Laden’s standing 
within the Islamic world. One additional policy 
recommendation that flows from this model, then, is simply 
to cease public acknowledgement of Osama bin Laden (or any 
future charismatic Islamic leader), substituting a coterie 
of aides or top lieutenants’ names for his name - if a 
name, face, and individual are necessary to sate the 
American public’s need to put a face on the enemy. This 
list, by definition, must be a revolving one, or the effort 
will run the risk of focusing attention on a new leader who 
may also consciously fill the role of the charismatic 
leader. 
Once the focus of attention has been moved away from 
the charismatic leader, the model suggests that the 
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religious and secular leadership roles themselves be split. 
In the case of Osama bin Laden, the obvious starting point 
is to attack his credibility as a religious scholar. As we 
have seen in the various case studies, charismatic Islamic 
leaders who have been able to utilize this leadership model 
successfully have had at least a basic education in Islam. 
This familiarity with the cultural symbols and terminology 
of Islam enabled them to more successfully manipulate and 
integrate these into their own program, ultimately 
garnering enough respect and authority so that they could 
actually change some of Islam’s basic tenets. Osama bin 
Laden lacks even a basic level of formal training in Islam. 
As one commentator has noted, “he may look like a 
traditional Islamic warrior, but his sense of the past is 
an invented one.”78  
Not only is Osama bin Laden “no religious scholar”, 
but he “is contemptuous of most traditionally-trained 
seminary scholars – the ‘ruler’s ulama’ he calls them.”79 
The policy initiative that flows from this, then, is to 
attack Osama bin Laden’s credibility as a knowledgeable 
Muslim. Ideally, such a move would have to come from within 
the Islamic community itself. The elaborate casting of bin 
Laden as a political-religious leader of the entire Islamic 
community in the mold of Muhammad would most effectively be 
contested by having the inconsistencies in his message and 
lack of formal training pointed out by Islamic religious 
leaders of stature, commenting from within.  
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Likewise, Osama bin Laden’s credibility as a secular 
leader has to be addressed. His rise to power has been 
closely associated with his alleged military and political 
successes; he first arrived in Afghanistan “in the mid-
1980s and took up residence in one of the many guest houses 
set up to receive volunteers. His multi-million dollar 
fortune made him immediately popular… by 1989, Mr. Bin 
Laden had founded his own network of training camps, which 
he called Al Qaeda.”80 With his rise to power so closely 
tied to his political and military success in Afghanistan, 
Osama bin Laden’s leadership is best attacked obliquely; in 
this instance, one method would be to ascribe all of his 
secular success to the organizational talents of one or 
more individuals of the Al Qaeda inner circle. Another 
method would be to emphasize the role that his money 
played, and ascribe his leadership solely to buying his way 
to the top. Thus, by dismissing bin Laden’s secular 
abilities, and making him appear to be a figurehead 
political-military leader, with the real decision makers 
and organizers behind the scenes, his secular role would be 
diminished and his impact on the Islamic community as a 
whole weakened.  
C. COOPERATION 
In addition to suggesting ways to undermine religio-
political leaders when our relations with them are 
conflictual, likewise this model suggests ways to treat 
leaders with whom we would like to cooperate. 
Given the secular, authoritarian regimes currently in 
place in the Middle East, few heads of state can be 
considered charismatic Islamic leaders as described by my 
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model. Most lack the sense of religious legitimacy that is 
conferred upon a Muslim who can tap successfully into 
thirteen centuries of historical memory. Indeed, few of the 
current state structures of the Middle East are even a full 
century old yet, most having been formed by France and 
Great Britain from the territory of the Ottoman Empire 
following World War I. By fully understanding that no 
leader’s power and authority in these countries flows from 
deep-seated cultural or historical imperatives, we gain a 
new insight into their regimes. The infamous “Arab street” 
is not with them or with their regimes. Instead, their 
authority is derived strictly from the state apparatus and 
associated security structures, equipped with weapons 
manufactured in the West. 
Ironically, the origins of many of the reactionary 
movements in the Islamic world which have formed in 
response to a perceived sense of falling behind the West 
have actually originated in the West. The single best 
example is that of Arab nationalism. The seeds of the Arab 
Nationalist movement were planted by American Protestant 
missionaries in the Levant region of the Ottoman Empire. 
Originally confined to Arab Christians, and primarily a 
reaction to Turkish dominance within the empire, by the 
post-World War II period Arab nationalism was being 
expressed by Gamal Nasser of Egypt, arguably the most 
influential Arab leader of the 20th century. Nasser’s 
personal charisma is legendary; the salient point for this 
study, however, is the fact that during his lifetime, 
Nasser, through the sheer force of his personal charisma, 
successfully grafted an imported Western notion 
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(nationalism) onto the rule of a Middle Eastern state. 
Nasser truly had the Arab street behind him. 
Tellingly, however, Nasser’s regime did not survive 
him. His successor in Egypt, Anwar Sadat, began to 
immediately dismantle many of Nasser’s policies. 
Significantly, Nasser had never attempted to appeal to 
Islam. Indeed, he persecuted Islamists in Egypt until his 
death.  
Dr. Ali Shariati represents another example of a 
charismatic individual attempting to graft a Western 
ideology onto a Middle Eastern one, in this case Marxism 
with Shi’i Islam. Along with the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
Shariati was one of the two main ideologues in Iran prior 
to the revolution. His message was that only an indigenous 
Islamic movement (he dubbed his Marxist Shi’ism) would 
provide an effective method by which the Islamic world 
could deal with the West. A Sorbonne-educated sociologist, 
his reactionary message was complicated, difficult to 
understand, and ultimately limited by the inherent 
contradictions between Marxism and Islam. Because of this, 
his following remained limited largely to the pre-
Revolution Iranian student population. Nonetheless, among 
those students who heard him speak, the charismatic 
Shariati offered what he termed an Islamic, indigenous 
solution to dealing with the West that ultimately had its 
origin in a Western –ism, in this case not Nationalism but 
Marxism. 
What is notable about both these leaders is that 
Nasser ultimately failed because he consciously cut himself 
off from the Islam of the Arab street, while Shariati 
failed because his vision, though it did incorporate an 
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indigenous Islam, was ultimately too complicated and self-
contradicting. Both men’s failures, coupled with the 
charismatic leadership model described in this study, hint 
at what is really required for the West and the Islamic 
world to successfully coexist in the world community. If 
one accepts Francis Fukayama’s thesis regarding the “end of 
history”, there is no longer a dialectic between competing 
systems of social organization: there exists now one world 
system, based on free-market capitalism. What is required 
for the successful transition of the Muslim world into this 
world system is a charismatic Islamic leader, one who by 
definition is both a product of, and wildly successful, in 
the Islamic world. This leader, once he has consolidated 
his authority, will then, with his words alone, be able to 
change the very tenets of Islam that enabled his rise, much 
as Khomeini did. If he could, with his words alone, change 
Islam and bring people along with him, it is not 
inconceivable that he could, for example, introduce a new 
democratic system of governance, or initiate an era of 
cooperation with the United States. It is with a leader 
such as this, as he is consolidating his authority, that 
the United States has the potential to attain the greatest 
policy influence. This is the only way that U.S. policy 
will ever effectively influence the Arab street: with the 
cooperation of a charismatic Islamic leader.   
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VI. WHITHER THE CHARISMATIC LEADER IN ISLAM? 
A. FUTURE TRENDS  
Having examined the origins and policy implications of 
this charismatic religious leadership model, it is 
imperative to consider future trends in order to answer the 
question “whither the model?” A true static model for 
anything that involves human social relations does not 
exist; any descriptive model is at best a snapshot of how 
things work at a specific time in history explained by the 
confluence of a set of defined, unique factors. It thus 
becomes important to attempt to identify changes and 
potential changes that may influence or alter these 
factors. It is only then that we may begin to discern what  
the implications may be for the future 
The most likely shift to affect this leadership model 
is demographic. If one accepts that personal charisma is an 
indefinable something that occurs only in a small number of 
human beings, and then only in the process of interaction 
with a larger social group, it follows that in any given 
population there is only a finite number of potential 
charismatic leaders. It also follows that this absolute 
number of potential charismatic leaders increases as the 
absolute numbers of the population increase. Simply put, 
with more babies come more potential Khomeinis. 
One need not calculate precise mathematical ratios: 
the general trend is the key. By all markers, the 
population in the Islamic world is increasing dramatically, 
both absolutely and in proportion to the rest of the world. 
As Samuel Huntington notes: 
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Population expansion in Islamic countries, 
particularly in the Balkans, North Africa, and 
Central Asia, has been significantly greater than 
that in the neighboring countries and in the 
world generally. Between 1965 and 1990 the total 
number of people on earth rose from 3.3 billion 
to 5.3 billion, an annual growth rate of 1.85 
percent. In Muslim societies growth rates were 
almost always over 2.0 percent, often exceeded 
2.5 percent, and at times were over 3.0 percent… 
Overall Muslims constituted perhaps 18 percent of 
the world’s population in 1980, and are likely to 
be over 20 percent in 2000 and 30 percent in 
2025.81  
The numbers speak for themselves. From within an early 
population of Arabs in the vicinity of Mecca that numbered 
in the hundreds, or at most thousands, Muhammad appeared. 
The potential for a charismatic Islamic religious leader 
arising today from “among the world’s nearly one billion 
Muslims”82 can only be higher. If personal charisma is a 
biological trait that occurs with a certain frequency given 
the population, with a population of almost one billion it 
would be irresponsible to suggest other than this: there 
are simply more Muslims than at any time in the history of 
the religion who possess, or will be born with, personal 
charisma, which is the critical first element necessary in 
becoming a successful charismatic Islamic religious leader 
as described in this study. 
This demographic trend will continue, for: 
Growth in absolute numbers will continue to be 
large, and the impact of that growth will be felt 
throughout the first part of the twenty-first 
century. For years to come Muslim populations 
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will be disproportionately young populations, 
with a notable demographic bulge of teenagers and 
people in their twenties. In addition, the people 
in this age cohort will be overwhelmingly urban.83 
Meanwhile, increasing access to education, coupled 
with the expansion of mass communication, is transforming 
the Islamic world, in what Dale Eickelman has termed the  
Islamic Reformation, “a time of change as profound as the 
Protestant Reformation was for Christendom.”84 In his view, 
individual Muslims “in unprecedently large numbers – 
whether in the vast cosmopolitan city of Istanbul or in 
Oman’s tiny, remote, al-Hamra oasis – are examining and 
debating the fundamentals of Muslim belief and practice in 
ways that their less self-conscious predecessors would have 
never imagined. This highly deliberate examination of faith 
is what constitutes the Islamic Reformation.”85 
The mechanisms Eickelman describes at work in this 
Reformation, namely mass education and mass communication, 
hold serious implications for the future of Islamic 
leadership. For, if personal charisma is the essential 
first requirement as described by my model, developing a 
working knowledge of the cultural symbols and terminology 
of Islam is the next critical step; it is only with such 
basic knowledge that a leader can consciously and 
successfully tap into the Muhammadan leadership role. This 
knowledge, formerly restricted to the ulama and those 
enlisting in some type of formal religious training, is now 
accessible to all. As Eickelman notes, or:  
Quite simply, in country after country, 
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government officials, traditional religious 
scholars, and officially sanctioned preachers are 
finding it very hard to monopolize the tools of 
literate culture.86 
In other words, a working knowledge of Islamic 
theology, previously limited to a select few within the 
Muslim world, has now, through the dual processes of mass 
education and mass communication, become accessible to a 
higher percentage of Muslims than at any time in the 
history of Islam. This, coupled with the increasing 
absolute population of the Islamic world, suggests that a 
much higher percentage of potential charismatic leaders 
will now be exposed to enough Islamic theology to 
incorporate the basic tenets of Islam successfully into 
their messages.  
Evidence for this shift lies in the language used to 
describe knowledge of Islam. The Arab word jahiliyya is 
traditionally “the Muslim designation for the cultural and 
religious state of affairs in Arabia prior to the rise of 
Islam. Jahiliyya is often translated as ‘time of ignorance’ 
or ‘time of paganism’.”87 Given a radical reinterpretation 
by the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, jahiliyya has been 
recast. Stripped of its chronological meaning, it now 
refers to contemporary ignorance of Islam, which is  
something that good Muslims must actively oppose. According 
to Sayyid Qutb, Islam “should take the form of a movement 
struggling against the jahili environment, while also 
trying to remove the influences of jahili society in its 
followers.”88 Here we see that, due to the influence of mass 
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education, the very word for ‘ignorance of Islam’ has 
itself been shorn of its historical, chronological 
interpretation, and given a contemporary, political one. 
Upon examining demographic and technological trends in 
the contemporary political Muslim world, it is apparent 
that the preconditions required for a charismatic Islamic 
leader to emerge as described by my model are stronger than 
they have ever been, and are likely to continue to 
strengthen in the near future.  
This is significant for the United States because 
while the frequency of appearance of charismatic Islamic 
leaders will increase, the relative virulence of their 
movements most definitely has. Thanks to some of the same 
technological advances that have democratized formal 
Islamic learning, modes of violent expression have become 
increasingly deadly vis a vis the West. In the 19th century 
the Mahdi in the Sudan killed and wounded British soldiers, 
Foreign Office professionals, and Egyptian colonial troops 
in British service, all of whom were physically in the 
Sudan to oppose him. In the 20th century, the Iranian 
Revolution claimed many non-professional Westerners as 
casualties and hostages, but again loss of life was 
confined to the geographic limits of Iran. It has only been 
in pursuit of perceived Iranian apostates that the Islamic 
Republic has gone outside of its borders to kill: former 
CIA director John Deutsch estimated that for the period 
from 1989-1996 the Islamic Republic had murdered “at least” 
48 Iranians overseas.89 In the 21st century, Osama bin Laden 
and his followers have killed thousands of American 
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citizens on U.S., Saudi, Yemenese, Kenyan, Tanzanian, and 
Afghan soil. 
Another implication of this model for the future 
involves technology as it applies to the charismatic 
leader’s primary mode of connection with his followers. 
Technology has also evolved considerably. Muhammad and the 
Mahdi communicated with their followers through the sound 
of their voices in direct, person-to-person contact. The 
Ayatollah Khomeini made extensive use of cassette tapes, 
especially while he was in exile outside of Iran; most of 
his followers became followers after listening to his voice 
being played by a machine, while Khomeini himself was 
thousands of miles away. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have 
made extensive use of the visual medium. Recruiting 
videotapes produced by Al Qaeda are prolific in the Middle 
East, and one need only take note of the tremendous 
controversy surrounding the Al Jazeera network to see that 
video has become the primary mode of expression that Osama 
bin Laden has used to connect with the wider Islamic world.  
The implications of this trend are both fascinating 
and disturbing. Muhammad and the Mahdi were real people who 
interacted with real people. Khomeini was a real person 
whose voice was on tape. Osama bin Laden is a real person 
(or was, he may be deceased at the time of this writing), 
but through the techniques of modern video, there are 
always questions when an image of him appears: Where is he? 
Is he still alive? Is that really him? When was the film 
made? For the first time, the very real possibility of a 
made-for-mass-consumption charismatic Islamic leader 
arises. Ironically, this only underlines the salience of 
the model offered here. If this is indeed the ideal-type 
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charismatic Islamic leadership model that can most 
successfully be used to rally the wider Muslim world, what 
better way to attain power than to consciously use key 
elements of the model? 
Also, technology and the means of communication 
continue to advance. Given that Osama bin Laden has 
primarily used remote visual means to reach the average 
Muslim, this suggests that in the future a different 
charismatic leader could use even more sophisticated 
communications technology. The logical next step is 
digital: the world of web-sites, e-mail, and instant 
messaging. Small businesses in the United States have 
discovered that, through technology, it is possible to give 
the appearance of being large established businesses; it 
would be ethnocentric to assume that Muslims will not 
likewise utilize technology in creative, innovative ways to 
create potential “virtual leaders” or even “virtual 
movements” that can resonate throughout the Islamic world.  
B. CONCLUSION 
In the end, however, we must return to Muhammad and to 
Samuel Huntingon. If, as Huntington states, “neat logical 
categories are necessary if man is to think profitably 
about the real world in which he lives”90, then the 
charismatic religious leadership model described in this 
study, with Muhammad as the archetype, represents one such 
logical category that U.S. policy makers should be aware of 
when they think about the Islamic world. We have 
established that this specific model of charismatic 
religious-political leadership was developed and exploited 
on the Arabian peninsula in the 7th century by Muhammad. Due 
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to various ecological and social factors, the Arabs living 
in the region at the time were especially receptive to this 
form of leadership. Muhammad successfully folded the 
existing social structures into his new religion to form 
Islam, thus institutionalizing the religion with himself as 
the archetypical leader. The stunning military and 
political success that Muhammad and his followers achieved 
in the expansion of Islam stands as the ultimate proof of 
his, and and their, efficacy. Because the model-that-is-
Muhammad is intertwined so deeply with Islam, Muslim 
leaders throughout the centuries who have been able to tap 
into it have found that their message resonates strongly 
with all Muslims. The Muslim world, soft-wired to accept 
this type of leader, has produced many examples throughout 
history - like the Mahdi, the Ayatollah Khomeini, and Osama 
bin Laden. Osama bin Laden, then, stands as only the most 
current representative of a recurring type.  
Existing trends and conditions suggest that the 
frequency with which we will see this type of leader will 
increase in the near future. This is significant because 
the trend has also been for this type of leader to be 
increasingly virulent and anti-American in his messages, as 
well as increasingly deadly to U.S. citizens. It is my hope 
that by identifying this pattern and this model of 
charismatic religious leadership, we can more fully 
understand why Osama bin Laden’s message resonates so 
effectively in the Islamic world. Only with a more nuanced 
understanding are we likely to successfully prosecute the 
ongoing war on terror – and prevent the deaths of any more 
American citizens at home or abroad. 
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